



FACTS ON FILE

WORLD NEWS DIGEST WITH INDEX

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WORLD AFFAIRS

INDO-CHINA

Reds Take Dienbienphu

Allies Spurn Peace Demands

The French Union fortress at Dienbienphu was overrun by Viet Minh rebels May 7. The Communists claimed to have captured nearly 10,000 members of a 16,000-man garrison and to have killed or wounded the rest.

It was the first time in the Indo-Chinese war that a French strongpoint had been conquered by direct assault. The defeat cast a pall of mourning over V-E Anniversary observances in France and inspired much criticism of the Laniel Govt.


The Viet Minh delegation to the Geneva Conf. followed up their victory by submitting a cease-fire plan that called for French forces to leave Indo-China and for elections to be held without foreign supervision. France, the U.S. & Britain held that an armistice & Indo-Chinese election both should be policed by international observers.

Meantime, State Secy. John Foster Dulles renewed his call for a South-east Asian anti-Communist defense alliance. He implied that the plan would be pushed in order to draw the line against further Red advances even though Indo-China were lost.

Fortress 'Submerged'

According to censored dispatches from Hanoi, Saigon & Paris:

Final destruction of Dienbienphu occurred during a 20-hour battle begun by moonlight during the early morning of May 7. It climaxed 55 days of siege for the French Union garrison, which was said to have consisted at the end of 10,000 to 12,000 men—mostly French officers, Foreign Legionnaires of German nationality, French colonial troops from Tunisia, Algeria & French Morocco, about 5,000 Viet Nameese and a battalion of about 800 Thai tribesmen from the Dienbienphu area.



Circles indicate progress of 8-week battle during which rebels wore down & overran Dienbienphu fortress. Main French Union forces were in shaded area. Isabelle artillery outpost was last to collapse May 7.¹

The fortress had reported the Reds massing for a decisive push (their 3d attempt since Mar. 13) and French planes took advantage of a break in pre-monsoon rains to make heavy raids May 6 on Viet Minh troop concentrations. But the rebels threw many 1,000-man battalions into attacks early next day against outer-defense strongpoints on the southern fringe of the main fortress area (see map above).

As the day wore on, the Viet Minh "human sea" attackers closed in over the southern half. The defenders were said to have fought, as a rule, as long as they had ammunition and then resisted in hand-to-hand fighting until overpowered. According to press estimates, the rebels had a 6-to-one superiority in numbers and modern weapons of Soviet & Chinese type.

Brig. Gen. Christian de Castries, 50, Dienbienphu commander, ordered late in the day that artillery in the Isabelle sector fire on his headquarters if the rebels closed in on it. His last radio-telephone message to the outside reported the Reds "a few meters away" from his command post and "infiltrating everywhere," but he declared, "We will not surrender." He said he had ordered destruction of arms & equipment to prevent their capture.

Week in Headlines

International

Indo-Chinese rebels captured Dienbienphu, demanded French leave Indo-China after armistice. Dulles urged S.E. Asia defense alliance regardless of outcome in Indo-China.

Geneva Conf. remained deadlocked over Korean peace plans.

Russia rejected Eisenhower atomic pool without arms ban.

West barred Soviet plan to join NATO, revamp European alliances. Army ousted Paraguay Pres.

United States

Plans to curb McCarthy-Army hearings failed; Adams took stand after Stevens' 14-day appearance, called Cohn chief source of pressure for favors to G. David Schine.

Taft-Hartley Act revision tabled by Senate for this year.

Congress completed passage of St. Lawrence Seaway bill.

Justice Dept. established new anti-espionage unit.

Sports: Bannister ran 4-min. mile, O'Brien made 60-ft. shotput.

French Premier Joseph Laniel was first to announce the fall of the fortress when he told the Natl. Assembly in Paris May 7 that Dienbienphu had been "submerged."²

Reds Say de Castries Captured

Viet Minh broadcasts said May 10 that Gen. de Castries, 16 French colonels, 1,749 other officers & about 8,000 French Union troops had been taken prisoner with the fall of Dienbienphu.³ The rebels said they had "knocked out . . . more than 16,000 crack troops" during the battle for the fortress and that de Castries' 8 highest-ranking aides had been killed. There were no reports that any members of the garrison had broken through Red lines & escaped May 7, but accounts from Hanoi May 9 said pro-French tribesmen in northwestern Indo-China were looking for escapees—particularly in the direction of Muongkhua, a French-held town 35 mi. southwest of Dienbienphu.

Reds to Free Wounded

Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Viet Minh commander-in-chief, said May 11 in Saigon he would allow France to remove seriously wounded French Union prisoners from Dienbienphu. The announcement followed agreement by France & Viet Minh at the Geneva Conf. May 10 that the opposing Indo-Chinese commanders should arrange for the evacuation of the wounded.⁴

(The Viet Minh radio said May 10 more than 2,000 French Union casualties had been taken prisoner at Dien-



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1—see maps next page & p. 125 2—see p. 146A-E3 3—see p. 126C3, photo 146A3 4—see p. 134B2 (Consult Index Sections to this & previous volumes for other background information on persons & subjects mentioned in text)

Pressure Shifts to Hanoi After Fall of Dienbienphu



Open arrows indicate directions in which Viet Minh rebels were expected to strike after capture of Dien Bien Phu (Dienbienphu).

Rebel pressure was increased immediately in Red River Delta surrounding Hanoi, capital & major city of North Viet Nam. Strongest French Union forces were concentrated in that area, but Reds seized outpost 7 mi. west of Hanoi May 11 and were reported shifting troops & weapons from Dienbienphu to Hanoi zone. French Privateer & B-26 bombers carried out heavy raids May 12 on rebel bases threatening Hanoi's railroad & highway to seacoast. Gen. Pierre Louis Bodet, aide to French Comdr.-in-Chief Navarre, called Delta defensive situation "serious but far from hopeless or desperate."¹

Another Red thrust from Dienbienphu area toward Luang Prabang (Luangprabang), Laotian capital successfully defended against invasion last year, was turned back May 10 by French & Laotians near Muongkhua, 35 mi. s.w. of Dienbienphu.²

Blackened portion of map represents territory said to be in hands of rebels—mostly in Viet Nam, with small districts of Laos & Cambodia also overrun. (Wide World map)

"military action" in Indo-China "without the support of Congress." "Only the Congress can declare war," Dulles asserted. He said there were many complexities in negotiating a collective security system for Southeast Asia and the U.S. "never sought any sudden spectacular act such as an ultimatum to Red China." But he reported "good progress" toward a pact to assure "that Communist aggression will not be able to gain in Southeast Asia the results it seeks." "Dienbienphu will harden, not weaken, our purpose to stay united."

Dulles said he would welcome an Indo-Chinese peace agreement in Geneva that safeguarded "the freedom of the peoples of Viet Nam." But a peace providing "a road to a Communist takeover" or continuance of the war would make it "even more urgent to create the conditions for united action in defense of the area."

Dulles told a news conference May 11 that the U.S. hoped, by means of collective security, to prevent a so-called "falling domino" reaction in Southeast Asia—loss of the rest of the area if Indo-China fell. Dulles said: he did not "believe that (Viet Nam, Laos & Cambodia) are going to be lost or that we have given up trying to prevent" their loss; but "if events that we would not control (&) do not anticipate should lead to their being lost" the U.S. would not "consider the whole situation hopeless (&) give up in despair."

An impression in France that Dulles had in effect "written off" Indo-China was dealt with indirectly by Pres. Eisenhower at his news conference May 12. The President denied such intention, said Indo-China was regarded as very important to Southeast Asia and observed that there was no disagreement between himself & Dulles.⁸

Says Democrats Consulted

Commenting on charges by ex-Pres. Truman & numerous other Democratic leaders, including Senators, that the Eisenhower Admin. had not consulted sufficiently with Democrats on foreign policy, the President said May 12 that bipartisanship was practiced insofar as possible. Senate majority leader William F. Knowland (Calif.) had said May 11 that high State Dept. officials had consulted with Congressional leaders of both parties 91 times since Pres. Eisenhower took office. Both Knowland & the President defended the Democratic Party's patriotism, rejecting by implication Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy's charge of "20 years of treason."⁹

Geneva Deadlocked on Peace

The Western Big 3, Viet Nam & Viet Minh offered their respective peace plans for Indo-China at the Geneva Conf. this week. Neither the Allied

bienphu. Gen. Henri Navarre, French commander-in-chief, estimated May 11 that 1,300 wounded were in the fortress when it fell.)

Giap instructed Navarre May 11 to use helicopters bearing Red Cross insignia for the evacuation. A rebel broadcast said French "nurses" & other medical personnel had been ordered to care for wounded. This was taken as an indication that French AF nurse Genevieve de Galard-Terraube, 29, only woman member of the garrison, survived the battle.³

French Angered by Defeat

All members of the French Natl. Assembly except Communists paid the Dienbienphu garrison a standing tribute after Laniel announced the fall of the fortress May 7. The Premier called upon his countrymen for a "virile" reaction to the disaster. He promised that Forgn. Min. Georges Bidault, in negotiations with the Communists in Geneva, would insist on peace terms safeguarding French Union troops & preserving "the liberty of the (Indo-Chinese) people, for whom we protect both independence & the right of choosing their own destiny." Laniel announced, without protest in the Assembly, that more troops were being sent to Indo-China to make up for those lost at Dienbienphu.

A mood of mourning enveloped France and caused cancellation of many festivities planned for May 8 & 9 to commemorate V-E day in World War II and Joan of Arc's liberation of Orleans in 1429. Defense Min. René Pleven was booed by some spectators during rites at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Paris May 8. Admirers of Charles de Gaulle demonstrated for his return to power when he made a pilgrimage to the Unknown Soldier's tomb May 9.⁴ An engagement of a Soviet Ballet Corps troupe at the Paris Opera starting

May 10 was postponed indefinitely for fear of anti-Communist disorders.

(Pres. Eisenhower sent French Pres. René Coty a message May 7 saying Dienbienphu "will forever stand as a symbol of the free world's determination to resist dictatorial aggression." British Prime Min. Sir Winston Churchill said the garrison's "long & gallant defense, in the highest tradition of French arms, has been an inspiration to the free world." South Korean Pres. Syngman Rhee said May 8 the fortress might have survived "had offers of outside assistance 2 months ago [when Rhee offered 2 ROK divisions] been accepted."⁵ The West German Socialist Party expressed doubt May 8 whether Germans in the French Forgn. Legion contingent at Dienbienphu had sacrificed themselves "for a good thing." The Soviet press May 8 hailed the "liberation" of Dienbienphu as a blow to French "colonizers" & U.S. "aggressive circles.")

Laniel Govt. Survives Test

Premier Laniel, who had won a 311-262 vote of confidence in the Natl. Assembly May 6 after refusing to debate the Indo-China war, failed in effort May 12 to get advance assurances of another indorsement following a debate due to begin next day. The Laniel regime was criticized bitterly by spokesmen for all non-Communist factions in the Assembly May 12. But many Deputies indicated their reluctance to vote Laniel out of office for fear that no new Cabinet could be formed without national elections. Laniel had opposed a debate on Indo-China until after the Geneva Conf.⁶

Dulles Renews Pact Goal

U.S. State Secy. Dulles, in a radio-TV broadcast May 7 on Indo-China & the Geneva Conf., said it was possible that the U.S. might have to make "serious commitments" to help defend Southeast Asia, although Pres. Eisenhower would order no American

1—see p. 111B3 2—p. 118F1 3—p. 146E3
4—p. 112D1 5—p. 126C3 6—p. 65F2 7—p. 73B1 8—p. 145D1 9—pp. 155C2, 145C2

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nor Communist side indicated readiness to compromise. The 3 plans:

France (presented May 8 by Forgn. Min. Bidault, supported by U.S. & Britain) — Classified the conflict in Viet Nam as a civil war but called warfare in Laos & Cambodia the result of foreign intervention by Viet Nameese Reds. Called for: (a) an immediate truce in Viet Nam, with guerrillas disarmed and regular French Union & Viet Minh forces grouped in predetermined (by the Geneva Conf.) assembly zones; (b) complete evacuation of both regular & irregular Viet Minh forces from Laos & Cambodia; (c) immediate liberation of war prisoners & civil internees in all 3 states. The cease-fire would be supervised by international (UN) commissions and guaranteed by the 9 participating powers (Big 4, 3 Indo-Chinese states, Red China, Viet Minh). The French plan was limited to a cease-fire.

Viet Minh (proposed May 10 by Forgn. Min. Pham Van Dong)—Called for: (a) an immediate cease-fire throughout Indo-China followed by withdrawal of all "foreign" (French) troops; (b) complete independence for the 3 Associated States; (c) cessation of U.S. aid; (d) "free general elections" without outside supervision.

Viet Nam (proposed May 12 by Forgn. Min. Nguyen Quoc Dinh)—Barred any partition, "direct or indirect," of Viet Nam. Asked: (a) international guarantee of Viet Nam's political & territorial integrity; (b) UN control of the cease-fire & national elections; (c) Viet Minhese submission to the authority of the present Viet Nam Govt.; incorporation of rebel forces into Viet Nam Natl. Army. U.S. State Undersecy. Walter Bedell Smith promised to give "close study" to the Viet Nameese plan. He & British Forgn. Secy. Anthony Eden said UN supervision of the cease-fire & elections was "essential" to agreement.

Red Chinese Forgn. Min. Chou En-lai denied May 12 that Red China had intervened in the Indo-Chinese fighting. He attacked the U.S. for "spreading the colonial war in Asia."

OTHER WORLD NEWS

Korean peace debate was resumed in the Geneva Conf. May 11 when Soviet Forgn. Min. Vyacheslav M. Molotov indorsed North Korea's rejection of UN-supervised elections.¹ . . . Eisenhower plan for a world pool of atomic energy resources was reported in Geneva dispatches May 9 to have been rejected by Russia unless the U.S. would agree to a prior ban on atomic weapons. The U.S. was said to have rejected these terms during talks in Geneva between Molotov and State Secy. Dulles.² . . . European security organization proposed by Russia and the Soviets' offer to join NATO were rejected May 7 in an American note to Moscow. U.S. State Secy. Dulles said Russia had proposed only "a new facade of security behind which the fundamental difficulties & divisions remain unchanged."³

1—see p. 147A1 2—134C3 3—99F1 4—see
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30F2 8—149E2

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

MCCARTHY-ARMY DISPUTE

Full-Length Hearings Decreed

Senate hearings on charges exchanged by Army Dept. officials and Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy & his aides continued into a 3d week with only the 2d of 6 principal witnesses reached. A Republican plan to cut short the televised public sessions fell through when Army Secy. Robert T. Stevens said it would be unfair.

Stevens, having testified during 13 consecutive days, was followed in the witness chair by Army Counselor John Gibbons Adams, 42. Adams told in his direct testimony of an alleged campaign of pressure to secure favored treatment for Pvt. G. David Schine, former nonsalaried consultant to the McCarthy Subcom. Adams charged Subcom. Counsel Roy M. Cohn with exerting most of the pressure.

McCarthy's use of restricted security data received from informants in the Executive Branch became an issue arising from the hearings. He served notice he would defy Executive restrictions except at the request of FBI Dir. J. Edgar Hoover. Pres. Eisenhower May 12 denounced persons in the military who gave away restricted data.⁴

Ex-Pres. Truman, speaking May 8 at a Truman Library dinner in New York honoring him on his 70th birthday, warned that the President must assert his authority as "master of his own house" and save the country from "legislative dictatorship." He urged in Washington May 10 that the President disavow "political assassins" in the Republican Party. Truman said he would "take care" of a Democratic "demagogue" if he were President.⁵

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Summary of Open Hearings

(Proceedings in Washington of Senate Permanent Subcom. on Investigations)

11 Day—May 6

Atty. General to Study Case

The subcommittee approved a proposal by Sen. McClellan (D., Ark.) to send transcripts of the hearings daily to the Atty. General. [McClellan said later that one reason was to determine whether "a crime was committed" by McCarthy when he accepted from an Army Intelligence officer a purported FBI letter containing data from a secret FBI memorandum.]⁶

Sen. Symington (D., Mo.) demanded that the subcommittee try to identify the source of "this obviously fraudulent letter." McCarthy denounced Symington for this and said he was sorry Symington & Jackson had returned to the subcommittee after the 3 Democrats' walkout last year.⁷

Hoover Lauds Army G-2

Stevens announced in the hearing that FBI Dir. Hoover, in a phone talk that morning, had authorized him to say: "Mr. Hoover from time to

time since I have been in office . . . has commented in the highest terms on the cooperation between" the FBI & Army Intelligence.

Stevens Alters Testimony

Stevens voluntarily changed testimony given May 3 in which he had said that he did not "think that I saw anybody except some of my staff" when he returned to his office Feb. 24 after a conference with McCarthy & other GOP committee members.⁸ He said that after checking, he found that he "saw the press" and met in his office 21 persons, including Defense Dept. Counselor Hensel [now Asst. Defense Secy.] & Asst. Defense Secy. Fred A. Seaton.

McCarthy hinted at "perjury" as he asked whether before volunteering to change his testimony, Stevens had known that Seaton & a "newsmen" [identified by other sources as the N.Y. Times' James Reston] had testified at closed sessions that Stevens "was not telling the truth." Stevens denied that he knew what they had said or that it had caused him to change his testimony.

Stevens said under interrogation by McCarthy that he first heard about Mar. 4 or 5 that charges were being prepared against McCarthy & his aides. He denied McCarthy's implied charges that: (a) he was seeking to prolong the hearing to keep McCarthy from investigating Communists in the Army and (b) for this purpose, he had repudiated Welch's alleged agreement on shortening the hearings.

(Welch charged McCarthy with slowing the hearings by "a filibuster by . . . cross-examination.")

Loyalty Boards Accused

Stevens denied, under Cohn's questioning, that he had told Cohn over the phone that he (Stevens) would be embarrassed personally if the McCarthy Com. "exposed the fact that [Loyalty Board] members . . . had been clearing Communists." McCarthy & Cohn asked Stevens a series of questions virtually charging that Stevens illegally had ordered Loyalty Board members not to answer McCarthy Com. subpoenas. Stevens refused to discuss the legality issue.

Subcom. Chrmn. Mundt then read Atty. Gen. Brownell's opinion that Loyalty Board members "probably" must answer Congressional subpoenas to be questioned about charges of personal fraud or misconduct—but not to testify on loyalty matters.

Brownell on 'FBI Letter'

A letter from Brownell [in answer to a query sent him by Mundt May 5], read at the hearing by Asst. Subcom. Counsel Collier, told the committee it should not make public either (1) a 15-page FBI memo or (2) McCarthy's purported copy of an FBI letter containing "words & paragraphs" "identical" to those in the memo. Brownell wrote:

Hoover "advised me that he never wrote any such letter" as the one McCarthy presented. Its "evaluations of 'derogatory' or 'no derogatory' were not made by him nor any one

Stevens Sets 'Marathon' Mark

Army Secy. Robert T. Stevens was a witness for more consecutive days than any other person ever to appear before a Congressional committee, Senate historians reported May 10. He had testified during some part of all 13 days on which McCarthy-Army hearings had been held to that point.

But Owen Lattimore's 12-day appearance (the previous record) before the Senate Internal Security Subcom. Feb. 26-Mar. 21, 1952 was regarded as having been more strenuous because he had fewer interruptions of testimony than Stevens.¹

Stevens' duration record ended when he was excused from testifying May 11 due to slight illness.

on his behalf. . . . The document constituted an unauthorized use" of confidential information. "The 15-page memorandum, if made public, would reveal confidential sources of information [8] investigative techniques. It contains names of persons against whom no derogatory material has been shown & unevaluated data as to others."

McCarthy Defies Brownell

McCarthy, in a choked voice, said that "no human . . . or any other directive which is designed not . . . for the security of this nation but to prevent embarrassment of those responsible for covering up Communists . . . will keep me from making . . . public [this] type of information."

McCarthy told the committee:

● Brownell had "established a precedent" when he "made public FBI reports" in the Harry Dexter White case. Brownell had named a "dead spy" but "not the live spies . . . who are still poised with a razor over the jugular vein of this nation."

● He [McCarthy] had "no duty" to conceal FBI material which had been put "in the hands of Loyalty Board members with Communist records." He would delete sources of information from any material he made public. Brownell must "be called in executive session" and asked whether "there is anything in this 2¼-page document, other than the names . . . of a security nature."*

● "I think the time has come when we can decide as a committee . . . whether or not we are forever to continue operating under that Truman blackout order of 1948." "I have made a solemn promise to [the American people] last year that if they would get rid of my Democrat friends & elect us we would no longer be honoring blackout orders. . . . I don't think that any Congressional committee is bound by the opinion of anyone in the Executive as to whether or not we are entitled to such information. [Committees] must determine that matter for themselves. . . ."

● "This letter . . . is part of a sequence of letters showing that there has been espionage—Russian—in our

secret radar laboratories, and the frequency of reports [should] convince anyone who exercises good, common sense that we have no [A- & H-bomb] secrets from the Communists. . . . We should . . . find out who is responsible. . . . This committee's activities may well determine whether this nation will live or die. . . ."

● Mundt should call an executive session to decide "whether or not we are the lackeys to obey—afraid to overrule—a decision made by someone in the Executive Dept."

Board Member Attacked

McCarthy & Cohn asked Stevens whether he had removed a Loyalty Screening Board member [called "Mr. X" at the May 6 hearing but identified by other sources as Sherrod East] after the McCarthy Com. had questioned him Oct. 30 and "exposed" his Red activity. Stevens said Army Counselor Adams had the information and should testify.

Adams, who then took the stand, said: There was "some difference of opinion" as to Mr. X' status when the committee questioned him; Mr. X technically was a board member but (a) he had not participated since Feb. 19, 1953—15 days after Stevens became Army Secy., and (b) he had not been considered for a panel since the summer of 1953 when "some facts of a minor derogatory nature" were disclosed; Adams, on learning of the committee's later inquiries about the man, pointed out to officials that Mr. X was still listed as a member; Adams was then told that Mr. X "was no longer participating" and that the "simplest method of dropping" him was to wait until a new board was formed; the new board was set up in about Nov. 1953 and Mr. X was not appointed to it.

McCarthy was overruled in an attempt to question Adams about whether Mr. X voted in "each" case to "clear" suspects. The Senator said the purpose of the query was to throw light on his charge that unknown persons in the Pentagon were using a "fine, not overly experienced Secretary as their tool" to escape "being exposed."

Mr. X' Clearance Reinstated

Adams, under Cohn's questioning, agreed that Mr. X had full security clearance and was working on classified material when he was questioned by the committee Oct. 30. He said Mr. X' clearance was lifted in November for "reexamination" but reinstated about Dec. 1 and that Mr. X presumably was still cleared.

Adams said he had received a different description of the charges against Mr. X than Cohn's description. According to Cohn, Mr. X (a) "had engaged in fund-raising activities for organizations listed . . . as subversive" and (b) "had knowingly employed a Communist and put him in close proximity to Govt. employees."

Adams said that as he remembered, Mr. X was an official of Washington's Greenbelt Cooperative Housing Org. about 10 years ago at a time when the group employed a physician who, "it

developed . . . had a subversive background." From a transcript supplied by McCarthy, Adams read testimony that Mr. X had allowed his farmyard to be used for a party to benefit Spanish refugees but did not know (even at the time he testified) whether the party was under any group's auspices.

Monitored Calls Subpenaed

Mundt revealed that the subcommittee had subpenaed all monitored & transcribed phone calls in the McCarthy-Army dispute. Representatives of Army & subcommittee counsel & the Atty. Gen. were to review the calls to decide disposition of any security data.²

12th Day—May 7

McCarthy Calls Data False

McCarthy said while questioning Stevens that the Army charges contained false information about Cohn. According to the Army specifications, Carr had said Cohn "was too upset . . . because of the Pvt. Schine situation [to attend a Dec. 10 meeting of McCarthy, Carr, Stevens & Adams]³ and had departed for New York immediately after . . . the morning hearing." McCarthy indicated that Cohn actually had gone to New York Dec. 9, not Dec. 10, and had done so because his father was ill, not because of Schine.

Stevens Quizzed on Threats

Stevens, questioned by McCarthy & Mundt, insisted that he felt Cohn & Carr "were threatening me" over Schine. He said that Cohn's "declaration of war" statement, after Cohn had been barred from a Monmouth laboratory, was "part of a pattern" connected with Schine even though Schine had not been mentioned.

Stevens agreed, under questioning of Subcom. Counsel Jenkins, that incidents in which Schine was not mentioned were viewed by him in the light of previous events concerning Schine. The Schine matter, he agreed, was "intertwined" in conversations on Monmouth. Stevens rejected McCarthy's & Sen. Dirksen's (R., Ill.) suggestions that the "threats" were "ribbing" or "banter."

Stevens said he did not recall a remark, attributed by McCarthy to Cohn, that Cohn hoped some day to "have as much success in being able to get into the laboratories as the Communists were having." Stevens declared that "the Commies do not have free access to those labs."

Stevens told Potter that he felt the McCarthy Com. would have called off the Monmouth probe if he had given Schine a commission or permanent N.Y. assignment. But under McCarthy's questioning, he said he did not think McCarthy would have called off or changed the course of the hearings if Schine had been made a general or given special consideration. He added, however, that "there was indication that the thing would be different" if Schine received special treatment.

*Mundt refused to call Brownell unless the committee overruled him. tPressed by Cohn, Adams agreed to delete the word "minor" but said the information against Mr. X "was not sufficient in the opinion of the responsible officials to cause [his] removal." 1—see Vol. XII, p. 96N 2—see p. 151C1 3—see pp. 139G1, 137F2

Zwicker Affidavit Challenged

Stevens produced a Feb. 20 affidavit in which Brig. Gen. Ralph W. Zwicker had accused McCarthy of abusing him Feb. 18 in a hearing on the Peress case. [McCarthy had demanded May 6 that Zwicker's affidavit be compared with the transcript of the Feb. 18 hearing to see if Zwicker were guilty of perjury.] But McCarthy opposed discussing the affidavit.

Zwicker's Affidavit. Gen. Zwicker's description of his treatment in the Feb. 18 hearing, as related in the general's affidavit made public by the subcommittee May 7:

McCarthy ordered the hearing room cleared of all persons but the witness, and "I [Zwicker] was denied counsel. . . . I did not specifically request counsel. . . . McCarthy asked what Zwicker would do "if the day before a soldier were to be discharged. . . . I was informed that [he had] stolen \$50. My reply was that [he] would not be discharged until I was satisfied . . . as to his guilt or innocence." McCarthy "compared this . . . with the Peress case and asked why, since I knew Peress to be a Communist and was aware of his nefarious dealings with the Communist conspirators, I did not prevent his discharge. . . . I replied that I had no proof . . . that Peress was a Communist. . . . Peress' discharge was executed strictly under [an Army] directive. . . ."

McCarthy asked whether Zwicker thought that a general who permitted the discharge of a major he knew to be "a Communist conspirator" should "be tried" and dishonorably discharged. Zwicker called this "irrelevant" but, directed by McCarthy to answer "or seek refuge in the 5th Amend.," I answered . . . in the negative." McCarthy then said "I [Zwicker] was unsuitable as an Army officer. . . . I was shielding traitors . . . a disgrace to the uniform . . . either stupid or deliberately trying to protect Communist conspirators." McCarthy "directed me to appear before a public hearing [for] the public to see just what kind of incompetent persons the Army has in its officer corps." . . ."

McCarthy questioned Stevens about 7 persons (names withheld) whom the committee had investigated. Stevens said McCarthy had shown him 6 of the names May 6 and that (a) "4 were out of the Army before you took these names up with us" and (b) "the other 2 have been under surveillance [& investigation] for 2 months." pending "final determination." He said they had been removed after the McCarthy Com. had started investigating.

Hearings were held only in the morning to allow subcommittee members to participate in floor action on Taft-Hartley law amendments.

(Mundt decided at an executive meeting to ask Brownell whether any part of McCarthy's "FBI letter" could be made public. McCarthy, indicating that he would ignore Brownell's opinion [see col. 1 preceding page], said he would respect any request of FBI Dir. Hoover to keep data secret.)

13th Day—May 10

Efforts to Shorten Hearings

Sen. Dirksen proposed that the public hearings be shortened by having only McCarthy testify publicly after Stevens. Closed hearings would be held thereafter with testimony released daily to the press.

Dirksen announced later that he would ask May 11 for a vote on an amended motion to: (a) recess the public sessions after Stevens & Mc-

Carthy testified; (b) have Jenkins survey the charges & testimony and interview other witnesses in private, then submit by June 10 a report which the subcommittee would use in deciding "whether further public hearings are necessary"; (c) have the subcommittee "resume its normal functions [in] matters not related to the pending controversy" when McCarthy's public testimony was concluded.

Sen. McClellan announced he would oppose Dirksen's motion and offer a substitute providing that: (a) each principal testify publicly; (b) "each Senator have one hour (6 10-minute periods) for interrogation" of each witness; (c) "each principal side . . . have 4 hours . . . for questioning [each] witness"; (d) Jenkins continue to have unlimited time for questioning.

McCarthy on G-2 'Leftists'

McCarthy asked Stevens about a House report (issued Dec. 22, 1952) on the Katyn Forest massacre in Russia during World War II.² Stevens said he was not familiar with it. McCarthy said that, according to testimony in the report, "there was a pool of pro-Soviet civilian employees & some military & Army intelligence who found an explanation for almost everything that the Soviet Union did." This was while Maj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell headed Army Intelligence (G-2) in 1944-45.



Wide World

Sens. Dirksen (R., Ill.), pictured at left, & McClellan (D., Ark.) offered rival plans to shorten hearings. Both plans were rejected.

McCarthy asked whether Stevens had tried to find out whether "those individuals are still there." Stevens said "the odds are that they are not."

McCarthy said that the House report urged a probe of "wartime & postwar operations of Army Intelligence & counter-intelligence agencies." He said his committee had heard "that quite a number of [G-2] employees . . . suspected of Communist or leftwing sympathies were transferred to CIA."

Stevens testified he could not recall having (a) been urged by McCarthy to check on leftist suspects in G-2 or (b) asked the FBI rather than G-2 to investigate Monmouth because he did not have confidence in G-2. Stevens said that Army Intelligence was "in it fully & completely at all times," that the FBI had a "full-time representative" in G-2, that the FBI & G-2 used each other's facilities and that "there is a close working relationship."

Stevens related that he had, on McCarthy's recommendation, spent about 40 mins. with a certain major discussing Communist infiltration of the Army, but they had not discussed "Army Intelligence any more than infiltration . . . anywhere in the Army." Stevens said he was "not particularly impressed" with the major's data.

McCarthy asked whether Stevens recalled McCarthy suggesting that Stevens "conduct the investigation [of G-2] and relieve us of that burden [because McCarthy] couldn't investigate everything." Stevens did not recall.

McCarthy Sees U.S. in Danger

McCarthy charged that in "the all-important" "Personnel Research & Procedure Division of the Army Plans"—a unit Stevens & his aides said they never had heard of—there were persons "with such Communist connections & backgrounds that they are dangerous to the security of this nation."

McCarthy gave Stevens 2 names (not made public but presumably of employees of the above unit) and asked him to find out whether one of the 2 "has had reports made covering alleged Communist connections on his part and that his secret, top secret clearance was removed but he is still allowed to direct programs that are secret."

McCarthy told Stevens that in 1945 the War Dept. "inaugurated a new policy by removing the ban on Communists" and that "when I wrote you in regard to this . . . you wrote back and referred to it as an order damning people because of political beliefs." "That language . . . was not yours, was it?" McCarthy asked. Stevens said that "most of the language in the letter was mine" but that he was not sure about those specific words.

McCarthy hinted that he thought some of those suspended at Monmouth might be innocent and that Army slowness in clearing them was "grave injustice." McCarthy tried to question Stevens about Earl Browder's 10-yr.-old testimony that the Army had 13,000 Communists during World War II. Mundt barred the question on Jenkins' objection that Browder could not be believed.

Cohn reminded Stevens that he had said May 7 that the Army Inspector General had submitted his report on the Peress case. Cohn demanded "the name of person or persons who gave an honorable discharge to the Communist major." Stevens said he would submit the names as soon as he had a chance to go over the "voluminous" report. Mundt asked him to check with the Inspector General that evening to see whether he could submit the names sooner than that.³

Stevens' Protests Were Late

Under Cohn's questioning, Stevens admitted that he & Adams had attended some of McCarthy's executive hearings & subsequent press conferences and had made no immediate protest against what he now called unfair. His first complaint, Stevens said, was made to McCarthy Nov. 6.

1—see pp. 149E2; 68B1, G1, A2; 61C1 2—see Vol. XII, p. 206J 3—see B1 this page

Speed-Up Plans Rejected

The subcommittee debated & rejected Dirksen's & McClellan's plans to speed the hearings. (No testimony was taken May 11.)

Stevens said that other witnesses should testify publicly as he had done but that his side would abide by "whatever decision may be taken by this committee." The subcommittee's Democrats backed Stevens' view.

Mundt said that "a great many thoughtful Americans, not motivated by partisanship," were "genuinely concerned" at having the Army Secy., many of his top aides, 8 Senators & many Senate staff members "tied up" so long by "this miserable business" when they should be at more important tasks created by the international challenge to the "whole cause of freedom." He approved Dirksen's proposal personally but said he would vote against any proposal that "entities among us" considered unjust.

McClellan observed that if the charges against Stevens & his staff were true, they would do "less harm to their country" in the hearing room "than they would be doing if they were in the Pentagon."

Dirksen Amends Motion

After the noon recess, Dirksen announced these amendments to his motion [see col. 1, preceding page]: (a) "Other witnesses requested by any principal for rebuttal may be called in executive session forthwith and such testimony be made public immediately"; (b) McCarthy's resumption of inquiries would be permitted "with the understanding that no investigation of military installations or personnel shall be undertaken until [the end of] the pending investigation."

Mundt asked each principal whether he considered Dirksen's amended motion "unjust or unfair."

McCarthy criticized the taking of testimony in secret but said that he, Cohn & Carr did not object.

Hensel's attorney, Bryan, said Hensel would "go along" provided he could "be heard just as anyone who bears witness against him has been heard. . . ."

Stevens was absent, having been excused from the stand at noon when Welch disclosed that the Secretary had taken penicillin shots for a virus. Welch said Stevens felt that (a) Dirksen's amendment barring investigation of the military could be deleted and (b) "a fair & full hearing in the open was required." Welch was directed to phone Stevens for his opinion of the fairness of Dirksen's revised motion. After 2 calls, Welch reported that Stevens thought it "would not result in fairness." Mundt thereupon said he would vote "no" on Dirksen's plan.

McClellan denounced the Dirksen motion as unfair & unlikely to speed proceedings. He offered his substitute

[col. 2, preceding page] which was defeated, 4-3 (4 R. vs. 3 D.).

McCarthy, Welch in Dispute

Before the vote on Dirksen's resolution, McCarthy denounced Welch for having "welched on" an agreement made during the noon recess. The Senator said he had been advised in a series of phone calls that Welch favored Dirksen's amended resolution and that he (McCarthy) "reluctantly" accepted it. Then, McCarthy said, he was "shocked beyond words" to hear Welch declare, as the afternoon session began, that Dirksen's revised resolution was new to him. McCarthy demanded that Welch take the stand to explain why he "keeps me on the phone for 2 hours, I finally accept what he thinks is a proper document, and he . . . said 'I never saw it before.'" McCarthy also said he would ask in executive session that the committee let him resume an investigation of "some 130 Communists in defense plants" since "the statute of limitations . . . is about to run out."

Welch protested that "Sen. McCarthy knows I did not talk to him" and said he had talked to no one else about Dirksen's changes. McCarthy then demanded that Mundt clear up the origin of purported Army suggestions relayed to McCarthy by "Senators & others" whom "I am not going to name." [It developed May 12 that Subcom. Counsel Jenkins had told McCarthy he thought the Army favored Dirksen's amendments.]

Dirksen's motion then lost by a 4-3 vote (3 D. & Mundt vs. 3 R.).

15th Day—May 12**Adams Begins Testimony**

Adams testified all day. His story, as brought out almost chronologically by Counsel Jenkins:

Oct. 13-16. While at hearings in New York, Adams saw how "Schine managed to get himself" into photos by inserting himself "between the 2 principals." McCarthy expressed "irritation" about Schine, saying Schine "was not of much use to the committee and was only interested in being photographed and that he hoped . . . Schine would be drafted." "He asked me specifically not to tell Mr. Cohn his attitude. . . ."

Oct. 20. Cohn got "angry" when barred from a secret Monmouth laboratory and said: "This is war. We'll really investigate this place now. . . . They let Communists in and keep me out." Adams heard later that Cohn said he had access to FBI files. Cohn felt he had been "humiliated" deliberately. He said a press statement Adams had prepared would not be released because of this.² Stevens, before about 25 people, "made very conciliatory remarks" designed to make Cohn "feel good."³

Oct. 20-Nov. 4. Adams had as many as 2 or 3 phone conversations a day with Cohn & Carr. Cohn wanted Schine assigned to New York after induction Nov. 3. Adams was not yet dis-

turbed although he felt the pressure. Cohn & Stevens arranged temporary N.Y. duty for Schine for Nov. 3-18.

McCarthy told Adams about Nov. 4 he did not think the N.Y. assignment was "good," that press critics might call it "preferential treatment," that he wanted it canceled.⁴ On Cohn's urging, Adams fixed the cancellation so that Schine would not have to report until the following week.

During this period Adams told Cohn that "national interest required that Schine be treated just like any other soldier." Cohn "exploded" and said "he'd give us" national interest by "a series of hearings."

Nov. 6. Stevens, Adams, McCarthy, Cohn & Carr lunched in Stevens' office to discuss the facts that: (a) McCarthy "had stated [Oct. 13-14] that he had substantially completed his [Monmouth] investigation and was about ready to turn it back to the Army"; (b) Cohn was irritated at press stories about Monmouth which seemed based on Pentagon "leaks."

Stevens "did not . . . initiate the luncheon. I think I suggested it." "I did not tell [Stevens] that Schine was coming, and the Secy. did not invite him." Cohn had told Adams that Schine "might be in town and might be brought along." Adams had said it "was perfectly all right."⁵

Cohn said Schine had committee work to finish and was needed week-ends. Stevens said this could be arranged and sometimes Schine could be available after training hours.

Nov. 10. Cohn phoned Adams and asked him to tell Brig. Gen. Ryan, Ft. Dix commander, of Stevens' Nov. 6 agreement. Adams did so, and Ryan pledged to cooperate.

Nov. 13. Stevens told the press he knew of no current espionage at Monmouth. Cohn phoned Adams and said this statement "would be very damaging to Sen. McCarthy," that it might make people think McCarthy's statements "weren't true."

Nov. 14. Cohn called in distress at the press coverage of Stevens' statement. He indicated that it might mean "an open break between the Army & Sen. McCarthy" and "open hearings for the purpose of proving the existence of espionage."

Nov. 16. Cohn restated his complaint before Stevens, Carr & Adams.⁶

Nov. 17. As a result of the Nov. 16 meeting, Stevens & Adams flew to New York and discussed the matter with McCarthy at the Merchant's Club. McCarthy made a "rather jovial" remark to the effect that Stevens "had called me [McCarthy] a liar for the whole country to see." Stevens then told the press that he "had no knowledge of what facts might be available to the committee. . . ."⁷

Meantime Cohn mentioned several times that the McCarthy group was going to Ft. Dix to see Schine before going to Boston that evening. Stevens offered them a lift by plane to Ft. Dix. Schine met them at nearby Maguire Air Base, and pictures were taken. Adams never heard Stevens say he wanted his photo with Schine.⁸

1—see p. 137F1 2—p. 149D1 3—pp. 139A3, 137E3 4—pp. 138F3, 137E2 5—pp. 149D1, 140B1, 138A2, 137C2 6—p. 139E1 7—p. 139F1 8—pp. 148D2, 140B1, 139F2

Nov. 18. Ryan phoned Adams and said he intended to refuse Schine a weekend pass. Stevens, notified by Adams, said Schine should get the pass since his basic training cycle had not yet started. Schine got it.¹

Nov.-Dec. Cohn became "more & more expressly insistent" the next 3 weeks that Schine be assigned to New York after 8 weeks' basic training. Cohn accused Stevens of repeated "double-crosses" on Schine. "The abuse" & "pressure" from Cohn exceeded all abuse & pressure Adams "had ever received from all of the other officials of the Congress with whom I had negotiated in a period of 5 years."

Ryan told Adams by phone that: Schine's "weekday availability to the committee had gotten out of hand"; Schine had returned once at 4:55 a.m.; his unit was to go to the firing range; Schine "might be asleep on his feet and kill somebody." Adams agreed that the weekday availability end. Cohn called this a "double-cross."

Adams told McCarthy he could take no more "abuse," and McCarthy said he would send Stevens a promise of no more interference. Cohn then phoned Adams and said in effect, "I'll teach you . . . to go over my head."

Cohn, in a series of phone calls with Adams, accused Stevens of a new "double-cross" because of a change of orders requiring Schine to train Saturday mornings.

Cohn & Carr told Adams that McCarthy hearings shifted from New York to Washington Dec. 7 or 8 "because the N.Y. newspaper strike made it impossible to get publicity."

Dec. 17. McCarthy told Adams as they were entering a N.Y. hearing room that he was "not going to permit . . . any more" of his staff's "interference" at Ft. Dix. Adams said McCarthy's statement "would be absolutely of no value to me unless he stated it to Cohn in front of me."

Adams, McCarthy, Cohn & Carr had lunch together after the hearing. Adams said "Let's talk about Schine" because he wanted McCarthy to tell Cohn about his decision on Ft. Dix. Cohn "became extremely abusive, first to me and then [to] Sen. McCarthy" for "not supporting . . . his efforts to get Schine to New York." At first McCarthy "seemed to be trying to conciliate Cohn and not to state anything contrary to what he'd stated to me. . . . Then he . . . lapsed into silence."

After lunch, Cohn offered to drive Adams to the station. McCarthy & Carr went along. During the drive, "Cohn's anger erupted again," directed mostly at McCarthy. McCarthy asked Adams 2 or 3 times if he could get Stevens to give Schine a N.Y. assignment. (Cohn could not make a left turn to the station. When Adams complained, Cohn stopped the car and told him angrily to make his own way to the station. Carr told Adams later that "I should have seen the way

Sen. McCarthy was put out of the car" later.)

Dec. 19-Jan. 4. While visiting in South Dakota on leave, Adams received phone calls from Carr about Schine. On returning to his office Dec. 28, Adams immediately phoned Ryan to hear what was scheduled for Schine. Eventually he learned Schine was to be sent to Camp Gordon, Ga. Jan. 16. He told Carr this Dec. 30 or 31.

Cohn asked Adams about an AWOL charge against Schine for unauthorized absence on New Year's. Adams phoned Ryan Jan. 4. He was told that they could not fix blame, that the matter was dropped.

Jan. 8. Adams, in Amherst, Mass., received a call from Carr in Washington. Carr said Schine, in New York for the weekend, had been told to return to camp for KP Sunday. Adams said he could do nothing and asked Carr not to tell Cohn where he was. A few minutes later Cohn phoned from N.Y. Adams hung up on him.

Jan. 13. Adams asked Cohn in Carr's presence what would happen if Schine got overseas duty. Cohn replied: "Stevens is through as Secy. of the Army. . . . We'll wreck the Army. . . . We are going to . . . get Gen. Ryan [through "another committee"] for the way he has treated Dave. . . . We've got enough stuff on the Army to keep investigations going indefinitely. . . ."

Jan. 14. Stevens, before a trip to the Far East, told McCarthy Schine would be at Camp Gordon 5 mos.

Jan. 18. Carr, after a phone conversation with Adams, reported the Army program for Schine to Cohn, who called Carr from vacation in Boca Raton, Fla. Within the hour Cohn, "very upset," called Adams and indicated he could not continue his vacation because of the news about Schine.

Jan. 19. Carr phoned Adams and asked that "certain members of Army loyalty & security appeal boards" appear for questioning that afternoon. Adams objected. He said "there had been an informal understanding . . . that this matter would not become an issue." He asked "why it had happened." Carr said Cohn had returned from Florida the night before, 6½ hours after talking with Adams, and "there was nothing [Carr] could do."

The Army "did not produce the people" demanded. Adams conferred with McCarthy, who told newsmen he gave the Army until Jan. 22. Then "they would be subpoenaed."

Adams told Hensel & Deputy Atty. Gen. William P. Rogers "how the revival of the subject of calling the Loyalty Board people seemed to me to be related to Cohn's anger over Schine."

Jan. 20. Adams, on Rogers' suggestion, saw McClellan on the case.

Jan. 21. Adams met in Atty. Gen. Brownell's office with Brownell, Rogers, Presidential Asst. Sherman Adams, White House Admin. Asst. Gerald Morgan & UN Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. Sherman Adams suggested that Adams prepare a written record of incidents concerning Schine. It was decided at the meeting that

John Adams should tell the subcommittee's Republican members the story. Adams & Morgan then called on Sen. Dirksen, who said he would ask Carr to delay the subpoenas. Adams' deputy, Louis Berry, contacted Sen. Potter.

Jan. 22. Adams discussed the matter with Mundt. In the evening, Adams went on invitation to McCarthy's home and discussed Schine & the Loyalty Board subpoenas. McCarthy suggested several times that Schine get N.Y. duty. McCarthy said Cohn "inadvertently [had] done the Army a great favor" because the committee could not investigate the Army after Cohn's "extreme pressures" on it.

McCarthy received a call from columnist George Sokolsky and put Adams on the phone. Sokolsky asked what would happen to Schine and why there was a "flare-up" between Adams & Cohn. Adams denied any "flare-up."²

Jan. 23. Adams started preparing the record Sherman Adams suggested.

Feb. 5. Adams, urged by Carr, phoned Sokolsky. Sokolsky said he would try to soften McCarthy's pressure if Schine were permitted to take a CID school course (Course 95) from which soldiers ordinarily were excluded until they finished their 2d 8 weeks of basic training.

Feb. 12. Adams phoned Sokolsky after Carr again had urged him to do so because Sokolsky had "a great deal of influence" with McCarthy and "gets mad" if "he feels he should be consulted [and] isn't consulted." Sokolsky said that if Schine were assigned to Course 95, "he [Sokolsky] would move in and stop this investigation of the Army." Adams told the story to Stevens who instructed that Schine complete his 2d 8 weeks of basic training first — "which would positively preclude him from entering Course 95."

Feb. 16. "On the same sort of persuasion," Adams phoned Sokolsky and told him Schine would not enter Course 95. Sokolsky said that "the Army was being very foolish, [was] asking for a 2-yr. fight."

[McCarthy told the AP May 12 that Sokolsky's "only connection was that he was approached by Adams at the request of Stevens to get him to use his influence to get the investigation called off."]

Feb. 18. McCarthy, questioning Gen. Zwicker in New York, thought Adams was "coaching" Zwicker and ordered Adams to the witness stand. Adams refused, then asked & received permission to get instructions from Stevens. Then McCarthy ordered everyone from the room "excepting the witness," and Zwicker was interrogated without counsel.³

(Adams later asked Cohn how he could get McCarthy to reverse his order. Cohn said: "I am no longer authorized to deal with you. Talk to Carr or Sokolsky.")

Mar. 5. Adams met Carr at Carr's request. Carr said that while Schine's assignment was "not satisfactory" to Cohn, "the Army was in for continued trouble." Carr emphasized that he had "no personal interest in Schine."

1—see p. 140E3 2—see pp. 140A2, 139F1 3—see p. 157B1 (Consult Index by name & subject for other background references)

Senate Tables Labor Bill

A A Senate bill to amend the Taft-Hartley Labor Act was referred back to committee May 7 by a vote of 50-42. Majority leader William F. Knowland (R., Calif.) said the Senate's action would kill prospects for Taft-Hartley revision this year.

All Senate Democrats supported recommitment—Northerners because they thought the measure (\$2650) retained too many "anti-union" measures and gave states excessive authority to pass labor curbs, and Southerners because they thought the revisions too weak on regulating unions & recognizing states' rights. (Vote for recommitment: 46 Dems.; Repubs. Langer, Malone, Young; ind. Morse. Against: 42 Repubs.)

The proposed measure would have made it optional rather than mandatory for the NLRB to issue injunctions against secondary boycotts. It also would have given states priority in regulating a labor dispute constituting a "clear & present danger to the health or safety of the people." Most of Pres. Eisenhower's recommendations on Taft-Hartley revision¹ were included in the bill, but his requests for pre-strike votes under Govt. supervision and minimum standards for administering welfare funds were omitted.²

Seaway Bill Passed

A bill authorizing the U.S. Govt. to join with Canada in constructing the St. Lawrence Seaway was signed by Pres. Eisenhower May 13. The measure, recommended by every President since Harding over a 30-yr. period, was passed by 241-158 in the House May 6 and by voice vote in the Senate May 7. It authorized the President to set up a St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corp., to be financed by a \$105 million bond issue, to help develop a 114-mi. stretch of the St. Lawrence River (between Montreal & Ogdensburg, N.Y.) to accommodate seagoing vessels. U.S. portion of the project called for construction of 2 canals, 3 locks & other improvements. Canada was expected to assume \$200 million worth of work on its part of the new system, which was to complete a seaway of at least 25-ft. depth from Duluth to the Atlantic via the Great Lakes.³

Internal Security Div. of the Justice Dept. to expedite prosecution of spies & subversives was established under an order announced by the President May 9. He nominated William F. Tompkins, 41, of Maplewood, N.J., U.S. Attorney for New Jersey, to head the new unit as 8th Asst. Attorney General.⁴ . . . Constitutional amendment to limit the Supreme Court to 9 justices and require that members of the court retire at age 75 was passed, 58-19, by the Senate May 11. It was still subject to passage by the House & ratification by the states.⁵

. . . "For America" organization, described as a nonpartisan group to "combat super-internationalism & communism," was formed in Chicago May 7 under co-chairmanship of Clarence E. Manion & Robert E. Wood. Other leaders in the organization: Col. Robert R. McCormick, Burton K. Wheeler, Hamilton Fish, John T. Flynn, Daniel Rice.⁶

OBITUARIES

Harry W. Baals, 67, mayor of Ft. Wayne, Ind.; May 9 in Ft. Wayne.

Crown Princess Cecilie Auguste Marie of Prussia, 67, daughter-in-law of Kaiser Wilhelm III; May 6 in Bad Kissingen, Germany.

Bertie Charles Forbes, 73, founder of *Forbes Magazine*; May 6 in New York of heart attack.

Howard F. Holman, 75, Diamond Match Co. chrmn; May 5, Suffern, N.Y.

David H. Knott, 75, chrmn. Knott Hotels Corp.; May 4 in New York.

Jacob Kay Lasser, 57, accountant, author of best-selling instruction annual on preparation of income tax returns; May 11, in New York.

John E. Manley, 75, natl. secy. of Y.M.C.A. of U.S. 1933-40; May 6, N.Y.

Dr. Erik Reger (Herman Dannenberger), 61, anti-Nazi ed. of *Berlin Tagesspiegel*; May 10 in Vienna.

Frank Thomas, 55, Alabama U. football coach 1931-46 whose teams played in 6 Rose Bowl games; May 10 in Tuscaloosa, Ala.

Edward N. Valdvogel, 58, mayor of Cincinnati; May 7 in Cincinnati.

SPORTS**Mile, Shot 'Goals' Reached**

Roger Bannister, 25, medical student at St. Mary's Hospital in London, ran the legendary "4-min. mile" May 6. He won the mile event in 3 min. 59.4 sec. during a track & field meet in Oxford, Eng. between Oxford U. & the British Amateur Athletic Assn. Bannister, running for the BAAA, overcame a 15-mph. crosswind in exceeding the world mile record of 4 min. 1.4 sec. set by Gunder Haegg of Sweden in 1945.⁷

The first "60-ft. shotput" ever recorded was achieved May 8 by Parry O'Brien, 22, ex-USC student of Los Angeles. He threw the 16-lb. shot 60 ft. 5¼ in., breaking his own official & unconfirmed world records, in a special event of a USC-UCLA meet in Los Angeles.⁸

Winners

Asian Games. Japan scored 2,390 pts. to win the Asian Games May 2-8 in Manila. Team champions: *track, swimming & diving*—Japan; *basketball, boxing, shooting*—Philippines; *soccer*—Natl. China; *water polo*—Singapore; *weight lifting*—South Korea. Other countries participating: India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Israel, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Malaya.

Golf. \$53,000 Ardmore (Okla.) open: won May 9 by Julius Boros, 34, of Mid Pines, N.C., for \$7,200. . . . Greenbrier Open in White Sulphur Springs, W. Va.: won May 9 by Her-

man Scharlau, 33, of Boca Raton, Fla., for \$2,000.

Horse Racing. \$35,350 Withers Mile at Belmont Park, N.Y. May 8: won by Maine Chance Farm's Jet Action, Jorge Contreras up, for \$26,250. . . . \$25,000 added Dixie Handicap at Pimlico (Baltimore) May 8: won by Greentree Stable's Straight Face, Bennie Green up, for \$19,550.

Intl. Olympic Com., meeting in Athens May 11, voted 30-13 to hold all of the next Olympic "summer" games Nov. 22-Dec. 8, 1956 in Melbourne except for equestrian events. A new site for equestrian competition was to be selected because of Australia's law imposing a 6-mo. quarantine of imported horses.⁹

MISCELLANEOUS

Paraguayan Coup. Pres. Federico Chaves of Paraguay was ousted from office in an Army coup May 5 and Tomas Romero Pereira was installed as provisional President. The Colorado Party, to which all principals in the dispute belonged, planned to nominate Gen. Alfredo Stroessner for President in July and elect him in a one-slate election in August.¹⁰

Accidents. 100 persons were drowned May 6 when a tornado overturned about 150 small boats on the Meghna River, 50 mi. from Dacca, India. . . . 20 firemen were reported killed May 7 in an explosion & fire at a powder & oil installation on Braco Forte Island near Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Crime. Harold Jackson, 53, & Joseph Lear, 42, were found guilty May 6 in San Francisco of kidnapping realtor Leonard Moscovitz, 36, last Jan. 16. The jury verdict carried an automatic death penalty under California's "little Lindbergh" law.¹¹ . . . Richard Dix, 24, radio performer, was fatally shot May 10 in Chicago by a gunman who had attempted to attack Dix's sweetheart, Carol Giddins, 19. . . . Conspiracy to evade \$17,400,000 in income taxes on sales of Canadian whiskey in the U.S. by creation of numerous corporations was charged May 11 in federal indictments returned against 9 men in New York. Accused: Hyman Harvey Klein of Baltimore & Los Angeles; his brother Isidore and Albert McLennan & George Norgan of Vancouver, B.C.; attorneys Ellis Rosenberg of Washington & Morris C. Alprin of Brooklyn; accountant Maurice Haas of Mt. Vernon, N.Y.; Irving A. Koerner of Great Neck, N.Y. & Albert Roer of Brooklyn. . . . Ralph Franklin Jones, 42, of Houston, Tex. & his brother James Hollis Jones, 49, of Dallas were arrested by the FBI in Dallas May 10-11 and charged with trying to extort \$200,000 from 20 prominent Jewish families in Dallas with letters threatening death & injury.

Unmarried women of 35 or over in West Germany were advised May 8 by Interior Min. Gerhard Schroeder that they had the right to call themselves Frau instead of Fraulein. He held that there were no legal restrictions on use of the title Frau.

1—see p. 12A1, D3 2—101A1 3—22C1 4—121B3 5—Vol. XIII, p. 265D3 6—XIII, 422C3 7—XIII, 260F2 8—p. 144E3 9—Vol. XIII, 184G-H 10—XIII, 62K 11—p. 32F2